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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the process of job search, using a unique,
large-scale data set for Portugal that allows us to assess the effect of job search
methods on escape rates from unemployment and, in a new departure, the
impact of job-finding methods used by the unemployed on earnings. In each
case, the characteristics of workers receive careful attention. In addition, the
effectiveness of the job search process is evaluated in terms of the periodicity
of the resulting job match. Some emphasis is accorded the role of the public
employment agency which, despite its frequency as a search vehicle, is found to
have a low hit rate and to lead to low-paying jobs. Such jobs are also shorter
lasting, only partly because they are more likely to be of a fixed-term nature.
The policy backdrop is provided by the "employment chapter" of the Treaty of
Amsterdam. Given our results, some concern naturally arises as to the capacity
of the public employment agency to meet the targets set under European
employment initiatives.1
2 Introduction
The process of job search has received comparatively little attention in the job
search literature, which has been more concerned with the determinants of the
reservation wage in a framework that has often taken the arrival rate of job
offers to be exogenous (e.g. Narandranathan and Nickell, 1985).  Although
search intensity has been modeled in a number of theoretical and empirical
treatments, the tendency has been to treat search effort as a uniform activity
(e.g. Lippman and McCall, 1976; Barron and Mellow, 1979).  This is
unsatisfactory given long-recognized differences in job search methods (e.g.
Bradshaw, 1973), which clearly differ in their time and money costs, and
suggestive evidence on the apparent effectiveness of some routes (notably, the
informal channel of friends and relatives) and the seeming ineffectiveness of
others (principally, the public employment service).  Recently, however, the
process of job search has attracted closer analytical scrutiny with a view to
enriching, and ultimately testing, the basic search model and to guide policy
discussion.
1  The results have been mixed.
U.S. studies have the advantage of a measure of the time intensity of the
various strategies used by job seekers - together with information on a variety
of forms of employer contact - whereas the Canadian and British studies
reviewed below have had to work with information largely limited to the
occurrence of job search methods.
2  Perhaps the best-known treatment is
Holzer’s (1988) analysis of the search behavior of unemployed workers aged 16
to 23 years from the Youth Cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey in
1981.  In Holzer’s model, search methods vary in both cost and productivity for
any given individual - and across individuals, too, according to their human
capital endowments, background, and location.  In each period, unemployed
individuals seek to maximize the sum of current and expected future utility by
choosing a reservation wage and level of search intensity.  Familiarly, search
lowers current utility but increases the future utility of being employed by
raising the arrival rate of job offers.
Each search method is chosen to equate its marginal costs and benefits.  The
Holzer model contains the reservation wage, which determines the probability
                                          
1 Devine and Kiefer (1991) offer a useful survey of the literature on job search strategies and
the arrival rates of job offers.
2 The one exception to this statement is the study by Jones (1989),  using an EUI survey of
1,000 unemployed individuals in 1982.2
of accepting an offer, and the set of search methods, which determine the offer
probabilities (not wage offers).  Search intensity is a function of the number of
search methods and search costs depend on the frequency and time costs per
unit of each search method.  He distinguishes five such methods: friends and
relatives, responses to newspaper advertisements, state employment agencies,
direct employer contacts (without referral), and "other methods" which
combine all other remaining methods given in the survey.  He shows that the
two most frequently used methods of search are friends and relatives and direct
applications to firms, respectively, which are also the most time-intensively
utilized.  Furthermore, they are the most likely to result in job offers and
acceptances, together yielding 67% of all reported offers and 74% of all
accepted offers.  Acceptances as a proportion of offers received are particularly
high for the friends and relatives route (81%).
Holzer’s cet. par. analysis examines the determinants and outcomes of search.
First, search intensity (here the number of search methods because of missing
values for the hours expended variable) is modeled as a function of predicted
offers, inter al.
3  The relation is direct, suggesting that search intensity reflects
expected returns to search. Second, disaggregated results are presented for each
search method.  The latter probit analysis of use of the five search methods
indicates that predicted offers have positive coefficients for direct applications,
newspaper advertisements, and "other", but negative coefficients for friends
and relatives and the state employment agency.  Holzer interprets the negative
coefficient estimates as indicating that the low cost of the friends and relatives
route justifies this route, while the state employment agency is used by those
with few opportunities anyway.  He interprets his results as indicating that the
use of specific methods varies across individuals with different opportunities in
the labor market.  Finally, Holzer separately regresses ex post offers on first the
number and then the type of search method used.  Number of search methods
used has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of
receiving an offer.  Of the individual search methods, only friends and relatives
and newspaper advertisements have positive and statistically significant
coefficient estimates, though Holzer (1988, 17) chooses to interpret the positive
- albeit insignificant - coefficient for state employment agencies as noteworthy
"given their reputation for low effectiveness."
                                          
3 Holzer (1988, 14) cautions that acceptance probabilities have the advantage of reflecting
wage offers but the disadvantage of reflecting reservation wages as well.3
Holzer thus interprets his empirical results as favorable to the basic search
model. But rather different empirical results were earlier reported in a similar
model by Keeley and Robins (1985), using Equal Opportunity Pilot Projects
(EOPP) data for 1980.  (Four samples are identified in this study, only the
results for married males being considered here.) Keeley and Robins seek to
evaluate the effect of job search requirements under government transfer
programs (separate requirements for UI on the one hand and requirements
under programs such as WIN, AFDC, and food stamps, on the other) on job
search behavior and unemployment.  They find that job search requirements
under UI and other public programs increase the number of methods of search -
both public and private - but have mixed effects on hours of search expended.
And for a variety of measures of employer contact (namely, weekly rates of
employer contacts, employer visits, and job applications) the effects are
uniformly negative; in particular, large and statistically significant negative
effects are recorded for UI.  In terms of unemployment duration, search
requirements do not lead to increased hazard rates, holding constant the number
of search methods and search hours. Indeed, they reduce escape rates.  On the
other hand, higher rates of employer contacts, employer visits, and job
applications have a strong positive influence on escape rates.  These, then, are
the most productive forms of job search and they are not stimulated by the
search requirement.  Accordingly, the authors speculate that altering the search
requirement so as to include more direct employer contact could pay dividends
in reducing joblessness.
If these results are not contrary to the search model per se - only to Holzer’s
number of search methods construct - potentially more negative results are
reported by Blau and Robins (1990), who also use EOPP data for 1980.  This
study focuses on on- and off-the-job search and to this extent is more directly
related to a paper by Holzer (1987) on employed and unemployed search by
youths, in which it is reported that unemployed job seekers are more likely to
gain new employment than their employed counterparts.  This result is
explained by the higher levels of search effort - as in Holzer (1988), measured
by number of search methods, plus the time spent on each - expended by the
former group.  Familiarly, differential search intensity is linked by Holzer to the
higher search costs of the unemployed by virtue of foregone earnings.  Higher4
search costs imply lower reservation wages, and Holzer finds that these are
indeed lower relative to the offered wage for unemployed job seekers.
4
Yet Blau and Robins (1990) obtain exactly the opposite result.  Their treatment
investigates choice of search method, choice of number of firms contacted, the
rate at which job offers are generated given the contact rate, and the decision to
accept an offer given the offer rate.  The authors identify the same five job
search methods as Holzer plus a sixth, namely, private employment agencies.
Descriptive statistics reveal that direct applications to employers and
advertisements generate the highest number of contacts, that private
employment agencies and direct applications yield the most offers, and that
friends and relatives and direct applications have the highest job-finding rates.
In each case, the reported values are higher for the employed than the
unemployed job seekers.  In terms of effectiveness, measured by offers and
acceptances per contact, friends seemingly dominate other routes, as in Holzer.
The authors model job finding probability per method as the product of the
conditional acceptance probability, the conditional offer probability, the
conditional contact rate, and the probability of using the method.  The
reduced-form equations for each of these components take account of the fact
that the users of a particular method of job search are not a random subset of all
searchers.  Results are presented for all search methods combined, separately
for employed and unemployed job seekers, as well as differences in search
outcomes by method of search.
Among the more interesting general results are that UI recipients use more
methods of search but make fewer contacts and receive fewer offers than
nonrecipients; that blacks use more search methods but make fewer contacts
and receive/accept fewer offers than do whites; and that human capital
variables have mixed effects with, for example, education increasing the
number of search methods used, contacts obtained, and offers received but
reducing the conditional acceptance rate.  As far as differences between
employed and unemployed job seekers are concerned, all conditional
probabilities other than the acceptance rate are higher for the former.
                                          
4 Our analysis of Portuguese stock data revealed few overt differences between on- and
off-the-job search. Our inquiry will focus on unemployed search alone, which allows us to
draw comparisons between the stock and flow components (where the latter can only be
defined for unemployed search). For further U.S. evidence on unemployed and
unemployed search, see Blau (1992).5
This brief review of the U.S. evidence does not provide much support for the
public employment service, a conclusion reinforced by the continued decline in
its utilization since 1970 despite the increase in the number of prime-age job
seekers.  Between 1970 and 1992, the share of unemployed and employed job
seekers using state agencies declined from 30.2 to 22.6% (Ports, 1993, 65; see
also Bishop, 1993).  Indeed, the situation is even bleaker if U.S. critiques of the
operation of the state agencies are to be believed.  Thus, for example, Wielgosz
and Carpenter (1987) have charted the complaints of inadequate screening of
referrals, sluggish delivery, and "irrelevance".  Such charges are of course not
confined to the U.S. but may be less relevant to the experience of other
countries which record greater use by job seekers of the public employment
service, such as Canada and Britain where (male) utilization rates were 56% in
1983 and 83% in 1993, respectively.
Analysis of Canadian data by Osberg (1993) has focused on the selection issue
and in particular upon the possibility that the clientele of the public
employment service might have fared (even) worse had they not in fact used
this job search method. In his longitudinal analysis of the Canadian Labor
Force Surveys for 1981, 1983, and 1986 - chosen to pick up different points in
the cycle - Osberg contends that sample selectivity considerations are indeed
important in explaining the probability of escaping from unemployment.
Osberg’s data contain information on eight job search methods (in January of
each year) and job finding success (in February of each year).  His simple logit
model regresses job-finding success on seven job search methods, inter al.,
where "other" search methods are treated as the omitted category.  This
procedure is only necessary in the absence of multiple search methods (where
the categories are not self-exclusive), which is clearly not the case.  The novelty
of the exercise is the incorporation of a selection term. It is argued that job
offers are produced by some mix of individual effort and personal contacts and
that individuals differ in the latter unobserved (continuous) social contacts
variable.  Only the selection of individuals into public service employment is
modeled rather than simultaneous self-selection across all job search strategies.
Although the U.S. studies would indicate that the latter approach might not be
practicable, the issue of the dissonance between search method and job-finding
method remains.
In any event, and focusing here on his results for males, Osberg reports a mixed
pattern of coefficient estimates for the Canadian public service employment
agency by year.  In 1981 (when the unemployment rate stood at 8.3%), the
coefficient is negative for both the previously short- and long-term unemployed6
and the selection variable is actually positive  For 1983 (13.7% unemployment)
the coefficient for public service employment is negative and statistically
insignificant for the short-term unemployed and positive and significant for the
long-term unemployed.  The selection term is meantime positive and
insignificant for short-term and negative and significant for long-term
unemployed.  Finally, in 1986 (10.7% unemployment) the coefficient for public
service employment is negative and insignificant for both types of unemployed
individuals and the selection correction term negative and statistically
significant for each.  Osberg speculates that sample selection bias is not as well
captured in 1981 (as in 1983 and 1986), and argues that in bad markets the
long-term unemployed, if not their short-term counterparts, do gain
significantly.  The case of intermediate markets is unclear, at least for males.
His basic conclusion, then, is that even if the public service does not work in
tight labor markets when job seekers can find work on their own, they
nevertheless perform a valuable safety-net function in recession for
long-duration male workers "who have exhausted their normal job search
methods" (Osberg, 1993, 366).
Finally, as far as the other job search methods are concerned, and subject to our
caveat about multiple job search methods, Osberg is only able to identify
consistent job finding success for direct approaches to employers.
More optimistic results for the British public employment service (or
"Jobcentres") are reported by Gregg and Wadsworth (1996), in a study that uses
Labour Force Survey (LFS) stock data for the interval 1984 to 1992, and
quarterly LFS flow data for 1992.  (Our own treatment of Portuguese flow data
fairly closely resembles that of Gregg and Wadsworth.)  We shall focus on their
analysis of the flow data (for males) because it seeks to evaluate the
effectiveness of the various search methods, simply noting here that their stock
analysis reveals, inter al., that use of the public employment service rises in
recessions and falls in the recovery phase, as indeed do the total number of
search methods used.
Gregg and Wadsworth’s descriptive data for 1992 indicate that the media
(advertisements) and the Jobcentre are the two most popular search methods,
followed by friends and relatives.  These search routes also record among the
highest percentage of successful placements, their comparatively low hit rates
(of around 2.5%) being more than offset by their higher frequency of use. In
estimating the probability of successful transitions by job search method, the
authors’ probit analysis shows that direct applications, advertisements, and the
Jobcentre each have positive and statistically significant coefficients. Indeed,7
the estimated marginal effect of using a Jobcentre is to reduce the average
duration of joblessness by approximately 3 months, cet. par.  (Despite the use
by unemployed workers of multiple job search methods, Gregg and Wadsworth
- like Osberg (1993) - make use of an omitted category of "other" search
methods. The practical implication of this specification is that when individuals
use, say, both the public employment agency and "other" methods one cannot
distinguish this situation from one in which "other" methods are not pursued.)
Other results of interest from this transitions equation are the increasingly
negative effect of job search duration, the fact that the Jobcentre coefficient
estimate is highest among the long-term unemployed, the significant positive
effect of direct applications over both short- and long-term unemployment, and
(in one specification) the deployment of a selection term.  In the latter context,
the authors follow Osberg (1993) in attempting to model the selection of
workers into Jobcentre use (alone); identification is achieved by excluding
regional dummies from the transition probit and including them in the
Jobcentre-use probit.  The coefficient estimate for the selection term is positive
but insignificant.
Finally, Gregg and Wadsworth model the probability of using the various
search methods conditional on making a transition to work.  They find that
duration of joblessness is positive for the Jobcentre route, negative otherwise.
Interestingly, the effect of being a UI benefit claimant is negative and
significant for the Jobcentre, suggesting that claimants are less likely to have
got work through that agency.  The opposite is the case for direct applications
to firms. Low-skilled workers only appear to gain if they use a Jobcentre, and
conversely for graduates, with direct applications benefitting all skill groups.
This more positive view of the public employment service certainly contrasts
with the broad U.S. evidence and is hinted at in a number of other British
studies.  The latter have also tended to be more critical of the underlying search
model and the disincentive effects of UI in particular (see, for example, Jones,
1989; Schmitt and Wadsworth, 1993).  Given the dissonance between the U.S.
and British evidence, the relatively sparse literature on the process of job
search, and recent policy shifts in Europe seeking to build on the public sector
employment service, it seems well worthwhile to examine another country’s
experience - here Portugal - even if the data in some respects continue to fall
short of those used in the best U.S. studies because of inadequate information
on search intensity and reservation wages.8
In what follows, we present results on the impact of job search method on
transitions from unemployment, examine the probability of job finding through
a specific search route versus remaining unemployed, and provide information
on baseline hazard rates conditional on finding a job through a specific search
method (and thence differential hit rates).  In a new departure, we examine the
wage outcomes resulting from different job-finding methods, and the process of
wage determination across job-finding methods.  In addition to transitions into
employment and wage outcomes, we also for the first time present evidence on
the success of the job match by relating transitions from employment to
unemployment to the way in which the job was located.  Surprisingly, the
literature has examined neither the wage nor the transitions to unemployment
aspects of the job search process.  We use a common data set in stock and flow
modes (rather like Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996), which approach also allows
us to address the duration of jobs found through the public employment agency.
To anticipate our findings, we report that the Portuguese evidence more closely
accords with the U.S. than the British experience as far as the effectiveness of
the public employment service is concerned.
3 Data
The data used in this inquiry are taken from the quarterly Labor Force
Survey(s) (Inquérito ao Emprego) of the Portuguese National Institute of
Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica).  This nationally representative
survey inquires of a random sample of individuals their current labor market
status and past labor history.  The Survey is thus identical to, say, the Current
Population Survey in sampling the population of members of a state at a given
time and their elapsed durations in that state.
The Survey has a quasi-longitudinal capacity.  Each individual is interviewed
during six consecutive quarters, enabling us to track transitions across states -
employment, unemployment, and inactivity - for up to five quarters.  Transition
rates are obtained by simply identifying those in a given state, and their elapsed
duration, who move out of that state over the subsequent quarter.  The
transition rates can simply be computed as the number of individuals of a given
elapsed duration that move into a different state during the subsequent quarter
divided by the total number of individuals with the same elapsed duration in
that state.  In particular, transition rates out of unemployment into employment
are obtained by simply identifying those unemployed, and their elapsed
duration, who move out of unemployment into employment in the subsequent
quarter.  Conditional probabilities of exiting unemployment can be computed at9
different durations to yield quarterly hazard rates, namely, the pattern of
reemployment probabilities by unemployment duration.
This type of sampling plan (observation over a fixed interval - see Lancaster,
1990) will be used in a "flow" analysis to identify the contribution of the
various job search methods, described below, to escape rates from
unemployment, 1992-96.
5  It will also be used to assess the role of individual
characteristics in determining a successful job-finding method.  Since we can
also track all transitions out of employment into unemployment, we can offer a
measure of the "effectiveness" of the match produced by a particular
job-finding method for the period 1994-97 (job-to-job transitions can only be
identified after 1993).  Finally, the data will also be used in more conventional
stock fashion to assess the contribution of job-finding methods to earnings in
1997, as well as to offer a cruder check on the effectiveness of the public
employment service (than permitted by transitions out of employment).
From the perspective of job search methods, the Survey identifies eleven
separate search "strategies".
6  These were duly collapsed into seven separate
measures: direct applications on the part of the unemployed worker to firms
(direct approach), pursuit of informal channels (namely, friends and relatives),
use of the media (advertisements), contacting the public employment service,
self-employment, taking examinations, and a residual category of "other"
methods to include the use of private employment agencies.  Some
amplification of the self-employment category is required since it necessarily
refers to activities preparatory to self-employment proper.  Such activities
include attempts to get financing or equipment, or seeking to rent space to run a
business.  Less obviously, the category of "examinations" requires modest
amplification because it encompasses other than actual tests to include
interviews with employers which may be viewed as an intermediate stage in the
job search process.
                                          
5 The choice of sample period, 1992-96, is dictated by changes in survey methodology after
the first quarter of 1992. These included new sampling procedures and revised definitions
of the labor force status of the individual.
6 The 11 jobs search methods are the public employment service, private employment
agencies, direct approaches to employers, use of friends and relatives, placing and
responding to advertisements, reviewing advertisements, examinations,  taking tests and
interviews, looking for land or space for a business, seeking licences or financial
resources, and "other."10
Correspondingly, the Survey identifies twelve (collapsed into eight) job-finding
methods.  The additional category identifies situations in which the
unemployed worker is contacted by an employer.  This new category covers
direct recruitment strategies other than advertisements.  In the case of
job-finding methods, the classifications of self-employment and examinations
mean precisely that and hence do not exactly match the job search methods of
the same nomenclature. In the analysis of transitions (flow analysis), the job
search and job finding methods relate to successive quarters.  For the stock
analysis, job-finding methods refer to the current job, which may in the limit
have been held since labor market entry.
Each job search and job-finding measure will be employed in the flow analysis.
For the stock analysis our wage regressions have perforce to omit the category
of self-employment because the Survey does not yield data on the earnings of
the self-employed.
The Survey contains in addition to the job search and job-finding methods,
information on the UI status of the unemployed individual.  In the present
treatment, we simply use a dummy variable to capture the effect of UI.  Note
that this does not lead to a problem of endogenous sample stratification bias
because we are able to observe both elapsed duration and transitions out of
unemployment for both recipients and nonrecipients.  Other variables in the
survey include data on the individual’s age, marital status, disability, level of
schooling, past receipt of vocational training, tenure on the previous and
current job, overall labor market experience, number of jobs held, occupational
status, reason for job loss, industry, and region of residence.  These are
conventional enough, so that only the (monthly) wage variable requires some
clarification.  Wages, as measured by the survey, are not continuous but rather
categorical, comprising 13 wage intervals. Left- and right-censoring
characterize the bottom and top intervals.  The estimation of the wage equations
can be developed using a grouped regression model and assuming a parametric
distribution - here the lognormal - for the error term.
The restrictions employed in the flow analysis were that the individual be
unemployed (or employed in the case of transitions into unemployment) at the
time of the survey.  Only transitions into unemployment (and employment) are
considered.
7  The remaining restrictions - used in both the flow and stock
                                          
7 Transitions into various types of employment and into inactivity are considered in Portugal
and Addison (1997).11
analyses - were that the individual be aged between 16 and 64 years and
resident in mainland Portugal.
4 Methodology
In order to analyze the quarterly transitions from unemployment into
employment, given that the information on elapsed unemployment duration is
provided in months, we shall specify a discrete time duration model.  Calendar
time is divided into k intervals [0, c1), [c1, c2), ...[ck-1, ∞ ), where ct define the
limits of the intervals.
8  Discrete time (unemployment duration) T∈  {1, 2, ...k}
is observed, with T=t denoting exit into employment within interval [ct-1, ct).
The discrete hazard function, depicting the conditional probability of an
individual exiting into employment at interval t, giving that he/she stayed
unemployed until t, is given by
1 ,..., 2 , 1 ), , | ( ) | ( − = ≥ = = k t x t T t T P x t λ
where x denotes a vector of covariates.
Assuming a proportional hazards (or Cox) specification for the effects of the
covariates, the grouped proportional hazards model (see Prentice and
Gloeckler, 1978) is defined by
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where λ 0(u) denotes the underlying continuous baseline hazard function.
If, however, we wish to distinguish between distinct job search methods that
are instrumental in job finding, we can specify a cause-specific hazard
function, where we model the conditional probability of exiting from
unemployment into employment through a specific job finding method j, as12
λ j(t | x) = P(T = t,J = j | T ≥  t,x),
or, more specifically, under the proportional hazards assumption
λ j (t | x) = 1 - exp [- exp (γ jt + x âj)].
If, in addition, we are interested in the hit rates of each job search method, we
can condition the analysis on the occurrence of a specific job search method in
the previous quarter
ëj (t x) = P (T = t, J = j   Jt-1 = j,T ≥  t,x),
where Jt-1=j denotes that the job search method j was used in period t-1.
When we turn to the estimation of the choice of the job finding method, we use
a multinomial response model for which the dependent variable is a J-
dimensional vector of indicators y= vec {yj, j=1, ...,J}, with
{} j k for y y y k j j ≠ ≥ =
* * 1 .
That is, yj=1 if and only if, yj* is the largest across the alternative job finding
methods.  The latent variable yj* is assumed to be generated by a linear model
j j j x y ε β + ′ =
* ,
leading to the conventional multinomial logit model if ε  is assumed to have an
extreme value distribution.
The wage information provided by the Portuguese household survey is given in
thirteen distinct intervals. In other words, wages are grouped into 13 ordered
classes.  Fortunately, the limits of the intervals are known, leading naturally to
a standard grouped dependent variable model
{} ∑
=
> + ′ =
I
i
i a x w
1
. 1 ln υ β
The latent variable ln w*  is assumed to be determined by
v x w + ′ =
∗ β ln
and is known to fall in one of the I+1 ordered intervals (0, a0], (a0, a1], ..., (aI,∞ ),
which correspond to prespecified log wage intervals.  If ν  is assumed to be
                                                                                                                                  
8 In practice, we define eleven duration intervals corresponding to 1,2,3,4,5,6,7-9,10-12,13-
18,19-24 and more than 24 months.13
normally distributed, the model will correspond to a conventional grouped log-
normal dependent variable model.
Finally, employment to unemployment transitions can also be defined in terms
of a latent variable model
ω β + ′ = x V
* ,
where V* can be viewed as the unobserved value of staying in a given state
(say unemployment).  The binary response model can then be expressed as an
indicator of the positivity of the latent variable
{} 0 1 > + ′ = ω β x V ,
which will lead to the binary logit model if ω  is assumed to be extreme-value
distributed.
5 Findings
We begin our analysis with descriptive information from the quarterly flow
data, covering the interval 1992-96.  The first three columns of Table 1 present
the search methods and success rates of unemployed job seekers. Column 1
gives the number of individuals using any given search method.  The public
employment agency is evidently the most numerous category, closely followed
by the use of friends and relatives and direct applications to employers.  But
individuals use multiple strategies, the average number of search methods being
2.05.
9  Column 2 gives the number and share of those using a given strategy
that are employed in the subsequent quarter.  The differences in success rates
fall in the relatively narrow range of 13.8% (advertisements) to 18.5% ("other",
including private employment agencies).  We cannot conclude from this
information that any one search strategy is more successful than another
because, as we have seen, job seekers use more than one search method. More
information in this regard is conveyed by the "hit rates" shown in Column 3,
which more directly link the job search strategies with job finding.  The hit rate
is given by the number of individuals reporting being employed in quarter t via
a given method divided by those who were using that method in period t-1.
Rather marked differences now characterize the sample. With the exception of
                                          
9 But note that an individual has to use at least one search method during the last 30 days to
be classified as unemployed.14
self-employment - which may or may not represent a truly successful transition
and where the number of transitions is modest - the use of friends and  relatives
emerges as the most successful strategy, followed at some distance by direct
applications to firms.  The balance of the search methods have low hit rates in
the range 1.2%-1.9%, that of the public employment agency being in the middle
of this range.  Finally, Column 4, simply identifies those who found a job by a
particular method irrespective of the job search strategy used in the quarter
preceding reemployment.  Again, almost 70% of those finding work do so via
the channels of friends and relatives and direct approaches to firms.  The fact
that the number of individuals is now much higher than in Column 3 means that
an important proportion of the unemployed find work through methods that
they were not using in the previous quarter.
10
Table 1 abstracts from the personal characteristics of those using the various
job search strategies.  Table 2 investigates the probability of escaping from
unemployment between successive quarters controlling for such characteristics.
Unlike the British research reviewed earlier in Section I, no omitted search
category is deployed because of the use of multiple job search strategies on the
part of the unemployed job seeker.  From the table we can therefore merely
state that some search strategies appear to work in raising transitions as
compared with the artificial situation of no search  methods.  Such successful
job search methods are direct applications to employers, taking examinations,
and self-employment.  There is no indication that use of the other search
methods materially raise hazard rates (again compared with the use of no search
method).
The behavior of the controls is much as expected.  Thus schooling, the number
of jobs previously held, and the necessarily anticipated termination of a
fixed-term contract are all associated with higher escape rates, while UI
recipiency, tenure on the previous job, age, being male, and labor market entry
(denoted "first job") all serve to depress escape rates.  Less obvious perhaps are
the lower escape rates of male and white-collar workers and the failure of being
either handicapped or married to influence escape rates.  The year dummies
broadly indicate that flows out of unemployment are procyclical (1992, a low
employment year, being the omitted category).  The regional dummies capture
                                          
10 Another source of disparity between Columns 3 and 4 has to do with the latter containing
some workers who become employed as a result of direct approaches on the part of firms,
though the numbers involved here are small.15
lower unemployment rates in regions with large metropolitan areas (North and
Lisbon) and in the Algarve which depends heavily upon tourism.
Not shown in Table 2 is the eleven-segment baseline hazard function.
Familiarly this displays strong negative duration dependence.  For a male
unemployed individual who is aged 30 years and has 9 years of schooling (and
who corresponds to the omitted categories in all other respects), the quarterly
transition rates into employment decline from 44% after one month of
unemployment to 25% at six months, to 18.5% at 13 months, and to 17 percent
after 25 months.  We will subsequently provide individual baseline hazards for
the various job search methods and for the conditional hazards model, where
the differences in the height of the baseline hazards directly index differential
hit rates.
Table 3 looks at disaggregate hazards for successful job search methods,
focusing on the role of individual characteristics in determining successful
transitions into reemployment.  The reference category in this duration model is
of course the still-unemployed worker.  The most important results are as
follows.  First, as is to be expected, UI recipients are less likely to make a
success of the various job search methods than are nonclaimants.  The major
exception in this regard is the public employment agency, where the coefficient
estimate for UI is both positive and statistically significant.  (This result is most
likely a consequence of the requirement that the unemployed be registered with
the public employment agency in order to collect unemployment insurance
benefits, and therefore does not have a behavioral interpretation).
11  Second,
higher levels of schooling do not improve the reemployment prospects of those
securing jobs through a public employment agency or for that matter methods
other than advertisements, "other," and, most obviously, those finding work
through examinations.  Third, direct search notably fails to improve the
reemployment prospects of older workers vis-à-vis their younger counterparts
and definitively ill suits white-collar  workers.  Fourth, males gain most from
direct approaches to employers and the use of informal networks, which job
finding routes are also most important for those with greater job holding in the
past.  Fifth, labor market entrants face fewer difficulties in job finding when
they use informal networks and appear to increase their chances of employment
                                          
11 One might be tempted to ascribe the other positive UI coefficient estimate - attaching to
direct approaches from firms - to recalls and the absence of active job search in such
circumstances, but as a practical matter temporary layoffs are not formally encountered in
Portugal.16
if they take exams or interviews, though this latter effect is not statistically
significant.  The bottom line is that rather different (observed) characteristics
do after all define the success of individuals using the various job-finding
methods, a theme to which we shall return.
Figure 1 illustrates the baseline hazards for the job-finding methods given in
Table 3.  The baseline hazards again pertain to a male individual aged 30 years
with the mandatory schooling level of 9 years and where all the other variables
assume their reference values.  The height of the various functions reflects both
the frequency of use and the success of the job-finding methods.  The main
result is the negative duration dependence attaching to the direct approach, the
use of friends and relatives, and advertisement.  No such evidence of reduced
escape rates with unemployment duration is detected for the public service
employment case, which is consistent with some individuals using this route
after other job search methods have been tried without success.  As far as the
remaining job-finding methods are concerned, the limited sample sizes serve to
limit the inferences that can be drawn concerning duration dependence.
Figure 2 presents corresponding results for the conditional hazards, that is, the
pattern of escape rates by jobless duration interval pertaining to job finding
methods that were also the job search strategies pursued during the previous
quarter.  Here, as noted earlier, the height of the functions - only four are given
because of the reduction in sample sizes - now provides information on the
respective hit rates of the job search methods.  The relative success of the use
of informal methods of job search and advertisement is apparent as is the
relative failure of the public employment service route.  Consistent with Figure
1, all the successful job search methods other than the public employment
service display negative duration dependence.
If the above results do not augur particularly well for the effectiveness of search
and placement conducted through the public employment service, we would
stress that our findings are otherwise largely conformable with British and other
results.  One such link pertains to the search intensity literature.  That is, we
find that search intensity, as proxied by number of searches (but see section I),
is positively related to the overall level of unemployment, to the individual’s
jobless duration, and to UI recipiency.  These are familiar results - even if the
UI finding is contaminated by the registration requirement.  Furthermore, we
find that labor market entrants use fewer search methods, while the opposite is
true for males and more educated job seekers.  These and other results are
contained in Appendix Table 1 for a truncated Poisson regression - truncated at
one because individuals employing zero search methods in the last 30 days are17
not considered unemployed and are thus not observed - but are not further
addressed here.
We next turn to findings from the stock data for 1997. Success of the respective
job finding methods is assessed in terms of the resulting earnings levels.
Because there can only be one job-finding method, the earnings regressions in
Table 4 method use an omitted category, namely, "other," which it will be
recalled includes the use of private employment agencies.  Column 1 presents
findings for a parsimonious specification that includes only the job finding
methods.  It provides a rather different picture of the success of job search
methods than is evident in the flow data (see Table 2).  Thus, the two most
popular job search/job-finding methods of direct approaches to employers and
the use of the informal network of friends and relatives are markedly less
successful in terms of earnings (than the omitted category).  The positive role of
examinations is correspondingly elevated in importance.  The one constant,
however, is the seemingly abject performance of the public employment
agency.  Workers that report having found a job through the public employment
service receive 38.5% less than those who obtained their job through "other"
methods.
Our earlier findings point to the importance of individual characteristics to
unemployment outcomes.  Column 2 of Table 4 confirms that the same obtains
for earnings.  The negative coefficient estimates for the relevant five
job-finding methods are substantially reduced in absolute magnitude with the
inclusion of the human capital, demographic, and other controls.  Nevertheless,
the relative earnings disadvantage attaching to the public employment agency
route remains twice that of its closest contenders (and is 19.3% less than
"other" methods).  The magnitude and sign of the coefficient estimates for the
human capital controls (vocational training, schooling, and experience) are
utterly conventional, and the effect of full-time employment is predictably
strong.  The pattern of industry differentials are also unsurprising, the omitted
category being agriculture.
Column 3 of Table 4 adds "atypical work" (i.e. fixed-term contracts) and tenure
on the job to the list of regressors.  Both arguments can be interpreted as an
outcome of the job search strategy; for example, of jobs found through the
public employment agency which tend to be shorter lasting.  In fact, as shown
in Appendix Table 2, jobs found through the public employment service are,
cet. par., disproportionately of a fixed-term contract nature.  Specifically, if a
job was found through this route it is 3.6 times more likely to be a fixed-term
contract, as compared with the "other" category.  Not surprisingly, therefore,18
when fixed-term contracts and tenure on the job are included in the earnings
regression, the relative earnings disadvantage associated with jobs found
through this route is very much attenuated.  Yet this reduction is quite artificial.
The more important differences in earnings function across job-finding
methods are charted in Table 5.  The most notable feature of the table is the
differential returns to the human capital measures for jobs secured through the
public employment service.  With a few minor exceptions, the coefficient
estimates for vocational training, schooling, tenure, and experience are
consistently lower for this job-finding route than the other methods.  Also of
interest is the negative relative wage differential attaching to jobs located
through the state agency in public administration, which is not a uniformly
low-paying sector.  Even in the case of fixed-term contracts, such jobs typically
pay somewhat less if found through the public employment service.
Table 6 documents the likelihood of choosing a particular job finding method.
The reference category is "other".  Among the more important differences
between methods are the following.  First, people with lower levels of
schooling are more likely to find work through the public employment service,
though the likelihood is not markedly different from that obtaining in the cases
of direct approaches to firms and informal methods.  Second, workers with
lower levels of labor market experience are much less likely to find work
through this route.  Third, females are much more likely to locate jobs through
the state agency than through any other method.  Fourth, public administration
attracts a disproportionate share of those state agency placements, though again
this is even more marked in the case of those finding work through
examinations.  In very broad terms, these results from the stock of employment
are consistent with those reported earlier in Table 3 pertaining to flows into
employment.
The data on the number of events provided at the head of Table 6 indicate that
just 3.8% (=[444/14436).100) of employees in 1997 reported that they found
work through the public employment service, which may be compared with the
corresponding value of 10.4% (=[124/1192].100) provided in Table 1.  The
obvious implication, alluded to earlier, is that such jobs are shorter lasting.
12
                                          
12 Data on mean tenure from the stock sample - 2.6 years for jobs secured through the public
employment service - confirm this: direct approach, 9.3 years; friends  and relatives, 9.719
Table 7, which uses the flow data for 1992-96 to examine transitions from
employment into unemployment, casts further light on this issue.  Column 1 of
the table shows that compared with the omitted category of "other" methods,
jobs found through the public agency are almost four and one-half times more
likely to be associated with transitions into unemployment.  Solicitations from
employers and advertisements are also associated with higher relative transition
rates but the effect is altogether less pronounced than for public employment
service jobs.  On the other hand, those finding jobs through the examinations
route are only one-third as likely (as the omitted category) to transition into
unemployment, while direct approaches to employers and informal methods
have no discernible impact.  Column 2 of the table shows that the higher
turnover of jobs secured through the public agency persists - such jobs are now
just over twice as likely to end in unemployment than the omitted category -
when tenure and atypical employment are included as additional regressors.
Finally, it can be seen that part-time employment is not associated with a higher
transition rate; in fact, the opposite result holds.  It is difficult to resist the
conclusion that jobs found through the public agency are relatively poor jobs,
other things being equal.
We have argued that the effectiveness of the public employment agency in
Portugal is low.  But the observed outcomes are the result of a number of
factors that are difficult to disentangle.  The first is genuine ineffectiveness.
Second, the pool of jobs reported to the agency by employers is typically small
and comprises low-paying jobs that are difficult to fill. In this sense, the agency
can be likened to a search method of last resort on the part of employers.
Moreover, employers tend to avoid public employment service placement
unless they can obtain some type of subsidy for hiring, say, inexperienced
youth (and other labor market entrants). Both factors - as well as inefficiency -
hint at a potentially severe reputational effect associated with the Portuguese
agency.  Third, there is the "active" component of manpower policy undertaken
by the state agency, whereby it places workers in so-called "occupational
programs".  These are jobs paying the minimum wage and are typically in
public administration.  Here we may have employment of last resort. In this
case, however, our results do not appear to be explained to any material degree
by this route of employment of last resort because they are insensitive to netting
out minimum wage jobs and employment in public administration.  Fourth, all
workers who draw unemployment benefits must register with the public
                                                                                                                                  
years; advertisements, 6.7 years; employer solicitations, 6.1 years; "other," 9.3 years; and
examinations, 15.3 years.20
employment agency.  Here the selection mechanism involved favors workers
who satisfy the eligibility requirement.  In this case, selection is likely to go the
"other way" because UI-insured workers have longer work histories and greater
attachment to the labor force than an unemployed individual taken at random.
In other words, given the fulfillment of the eligibility requirement and other
things equal, they are more likely to find a job than a randomly selected
unemployed individual.
In the light of the above, although selection is implicit in measures of the
outcome of public employment service mediated job search and job finding, the
identification restrictions necessary to account for unobservables are almost
invariably arbitrary.  Thus, we still think it sensible to provide a reduced-form
interpretation of the point estimates for public service employment; that is, as
picking up both a low level of effectiveness and selection considerations.  This
more muted conclusion is warranted by the data at our disposal which preclude
our being able to distinguish between direct effects and the component
indicating how those using the agency would have fared had they not pursued
this job search route.
6 Concluding Remarks
Perhaps the major finding of this empirical inquiry has been that the public
employment service has a low hit rate and leads to jobs that do not last, that are
lower paying, and that reward observed human capital attributes conspicuously
less than do other job finding routes.  These results do not appear to be
ultimately determined by that agency’s role as an instrument of "active"
manpower policy, directing workers to low-paying public sector jobs of an
employment-of-last-resort nature.  Although much more work is required on the
distinction between the agency’s placement and employment functions, our
basic results carry through after netting out minimum wage jobs and/or atypical
(i.e. fixed-term) jobs.
An unsettled issue in this inquiry and all other investigations of this genre is the
question of selection into public employment service directed job search - and
indeed other job search methods.  In short, how would unemployed job seekers
have fared had they not used this agency as a search vehicle. Given the largely
arbitrary nature of identification restrictions - here, as elsewhere - we have
necessarily concluded that our point estimates are a mix of main effects
(pointing to the relative inefficiency of the vehicle) and selection, while21
cautioning that the selection mechanism does not always work in the direction
of producing lower escape rates/earnings.
The next issue is the efficacy of the other search methods and job-finding
routes.  Although we subscribe to the premise that workers choose those search
methods which they perceive as having the greatest return, there is mixed
evidence on the success of these methods.  To be sure, the crude hit rates for
direct search methods and the use of informal networks are higher than those
reported in, say, the British literature (e.g. Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996) but the
employment gains are muted and also do not necessarily translate into higher
earnings.  We would surmise that these results reflect the long-term nature of
Portuguese unemployment, the sources of which have been analyzed by
Blanchard and Portugal (1998).  There is at least the suggestion in our evidence
of a tradeoff  between job search effectiveness, as measured by reemployment
transitions, and the wage and employment outcomes.
The problems of such labor markets return us to the policy arena.  Under the
October 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, an employment chapter was inserted into
the treaties establishing the common market.  The goal was to secure a "high
level of employment," reducing Community unemployment of around 18
million (10.6%) and increasing employment rates (from their rather low level of
60.4%).  To this end, guidelines have been set for member states’ employment
policies.
13  The guidelines ultimately adopted in Council eschew specific
targets for job creation but they do contain concrete elements.  Thus, member
states are to ensure that all unemployed persons are offered a job, training, or
some other work-related activity within 12 months (or 6 months in the case of
young people under the age of 25 years).  Also, the number of unemployed who
are offered training is to increase from the current EU average of 10% to 20%
or more within five years.  Member states are to draft their own employment
action programs based on these guidelines.
To this end, Portugal presented its national jobs plan in March of this year. The
bulk (almost 70%) of the resources committed (Esc. 211 billion) under the plan
are directed toward the unemployed: two-thirds for youth unemployment and
                                          
13 Apart from the unemployment measures noted below (geared to "creating a culture of
employability"), the remaining guidelines seek to "promote a culture of entrepreneurship,"
to encourage new forms of working while protecting employment security, and to increase
the participation rates of women.22
one-third for long-term unemployment.
14  The public employment service is
assigned a key role in securing these goals. But, as we have seen, less than 4%
of the current stock of employed workers who engaged in unemployed job
search found work via the public employment service route and that, other
things being equal, it does a poor job in placing workers in long-lasting jobs.
15
Given its past record, it is hard to resist the conclusion that undue reliance is
being placed on the public employment service.
                                          
14 The residual 30% of the monies is to go to further education and training of the currently
employed.
15 Allowing for employed as well as unemployed job search, just 1.8% of the stock of
currently employed found work through the public employment service.23
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Table 1:  Job Search Method and Job-Finding Success Among the Unemployed, 1992-96
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Number using Number (%) finding Number (%) using a Number (%) employed
search method job in t job search method in by job finding method
in t-1 t-1 that report job in t
finding via that
Job search method                                                                                                                   method in t                                                                         
Direct approach 7,138 1,211 (17.0%) 305 (4.3%) 501 (22.0%)
Friends/relatives 7,942 1,191 (15.0) 597 (7.5) 1,067 (46.8)
Advertisement 5,485 755 (13.8) 106 (1.9) 151 (6.6)
Public employment agency 8,325 1,132 (13.6) 124 (1.5) 154 (6.8)
Self-employment 151 25 (16.6) 20 (13.2) 179 (7.8)
Examinations 2,061 275 (13.3) 29 (1.4) 113 (5.0)
Other (incl. private 924 171 (18.5) 11 (1.2) 116 (5.1)
employment agency)
Average number of search methods = 2.05                                                                                                                                                                      
Notes: See text
Source: Inquérito ao Emprego, 1992-96.Table  2: The Probability of Escaping Unemployment by Job Search
Method, Piecewise Constant Hazards Regression, 1992-96
                                                                                                                                                        
Variable                                                                              Coefficient                                            
Direct approach 0.220***
(0.043)
Friends/relatives -0.002
(0.043)
Advertisement -0.038
(0.050)
Public employment agency -0.051
(0.048)
Self-employment 0.402**
(0.205)
Examinations 0.179**
(0.084)
Other -0.098
(0.066)
UI recipient -0.199***
(0.057)
Schooling 0.028***
(0.007)
Tenure -0.025***
(0.005)
Age -0.012***
(0.003)
Male 0.203***
(0.044)
Married 0.040
(0.054)
Handicapped -0.382
(0.238)
White collar -0.148**
(0.065)
Number of jobs 0.017***
(0.003)
First job -0.411***
(0.073)
Collective dismissal 0.113
(0.075)
End fixed-term contract 0.156***
(0.052)Table 2, continued
                                                                                                                                                        
Year 1993 -0.217***
(0.073)
Year 1994 -0.053
(0.072)
Year 1995 -0.259***
(0.076)
Year 1996 -0.106
(0.784)
Region A: Algarve -0.231**
(0.096)
Region B: Central 0.034
(0.084)
Region C: Lisbon -0.288***
(0.068)
Region D: North -0.216***
(0.069)
Log likelihood -6283.296
n                                                                                          16032                                                 
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels,
respectively.  The baseline hazard function comprises 11 intervals (see text).
Source: Inquérito ao Emprego, 1992-96.Table  3: The Probability of Escaping Unemployment, Disaggregate Results, Piecewise Constant Hazards Regressions,
1992-96
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                          Job Finding Method                                                                                                               
Direct Friends/ Public employment Self- Contacted by
approach relatives Advertisement agency Employment Other Examinations employer
(491 events) (1046 events) (148 events) (145 events) (173 events) (112 events) (114 events) (101 events)
Variable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
UI recipient -0.145 -0.221*** -0.741*** 0.794*** -0.785*** -0.284 -1.127*** 0.374*
(0.112) (0.081) (0.247) (0.197) (0.192) (0.319) (0.315) (0.217)
Schooling -0.490*** -0.023** 0.133*** 0.019 0.073*** 0.363*** 0.107*** -0.086**
(0.017) (0.010) (0.024) (0.029) (0.023) (0.030) (0.027) (0.042)
Tenure -0.029*** -0.020*** -0.035* -0.058** -0.010 0.025 -0.047** -0.031*
(0.010) (0.007) (0.021) (0.023) (0.011) (0.026) (0.023) (0.019)
Age -0.035*** -0.022*** -0.005 -0.009 0.014 -0.026 0.005 0.013
(0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.020) (0.012) (0.011)
Male 0.364*** 0.189*** 0.242 -0.262 0.857 -0.173 0.237 -0.164
(0.095) (0.064) (0.170) (0.176) (0.171) (0.204) (0.195) (0.214)
Married 0.258** -0.166** -0.012 -0.174 0.967*** 0.211 0.011 0.404
(0.116) (0.081) (0.217) (0.205) (0.213) (0.272) (0.246) (0.260)
Handicapped -0.710 -0.340 - 0.823 0.339 - - -
(0.582) (0.337) (0.597) (0.589)
White collar -0.408** -0.011 -0.336 0.058 0.024 -0.066 -0.261 -0.326
(0.162) (0.096) (0.235) (0.255) (0.212) (0.309) (0.272) (0.414)
Number of jobs 0.019** 0.017*** -0.001 -0.009 0.016 0.006 -0.012 0.003
(0.008) (0.005) (0.026) (0.014) (0.013) (0.026) (0.039) (0.009)Table 3, continued                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
First job -0.678*** -0.273*** -0.900*** -0.420 -1.037*** 0.409 -0.662** -1.110
(0.173) (0.105) (0.271) (0.326) (0.372) (0.375) (0.311) (0.768)
Collective 0.517*** -0.041 -0.032 0.062 0.044 -0.095 0.066 -0.018
dismissal (0.141) (0.116) (0.317) (0.323) (0.229) (0.632) (0.348) (0.426)
End fixed-term 0.030 0.150* -0.127 0.283 -0.252 0.899*** -0.081 0.801***
contract (0.113) (0.077) (0.208) (0.210) (0.196) (0.282) (0.242) (0.275)
Region A: Algarve 0.243 -0.224 -1.689 -0.530** 0.128 -0.994* 1.238** -1.141**
(0.197) (0.147) (1.057) (0.268) (0.335) (0.570) (0.619) (0.447)
Region B: Central 0.715*** -0.169 0.116 -0.797*** 0.230 0.372 0.941 -2.204***
(0.166) (0.135) (0.510) (0.291) (0.321) (0.364) (0.634) (0.732)
Region C: Lisbon -0.204 -0.174* 0.962 -1.817*** -0.096 -0.973*** 1.440*** -0.974***
(0.154) (0.099) (0.362) (0.251) (0.263) (0.332) (0.529) (0.258)
Region D: North -0.110 -0.032 0.788** -1.820*** -0.269 -0.294 1.435*** -1.543***
(0.155) (0.099) (0.371) (0.257) (0.277) (0.310) (0.534) (0.344)
Log likelihood -2042.321 -3703.947 -758.677 -742.833 -888.685 -493.045 -634.171 -500.408
n 16032 16032 16032 16032 16032 16032 16032 16032
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  The job finding categories of self-employment and
examinations do not exactly correspond to their counterparts in Tables 1 and 2, while unemployed workers contacted by employers have no job search
counterpart.
Source: Inquérito ao Emprego, 1992-96.Table  4: Earnings Determination by Job-Finding Method, Grouped
Regression, Log-Normal Distribution, 1997
___________________________________________________________________________
Variable Specification
___________________________________________________________________________
Intercept 4.688*** 2.985*** 3.135***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.028)
Direct approach -0.350*** -0.095*** -0.098***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.015)
Friends/relatives -0.340*** -0.110*** -0.114***
(0.021) (0.015) (0.015)
Advertisement -0.128*** -0.083*** -0.051**
(0.029) (0.020) (0.020)
Public employment agency -0.486*** -0.215*** -0.136***
(0.030) (0.022) (0.021)
Examinations 0.338*** 0.130*** 0.107***
(0.023) (0.016) (0.016)
Contacted by employer -0.345*** -0.100*** -0.056***
(0.031) (0.022) (0.021)
Vocational training 0.022** 0.017*
(0.010) (0.010)
Schooling 0.075*** 0.071***
(0.001) (0.001)
Tenure - 0.015***
(0.001)
Tenure squared - -0.0001***
(0.00003)
Experience 0.036*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.0001)
Experience squared -0.001*** 0.0004***
(0.00002) (0.00002)
Male 0.165*** 0.167***
(0.006) (0.006)
Fixed-term contract - -0.029***
(0.008)
Full-time employment 0.475*** 0.427***
(0.014) (0.014)Table 4, continued                                                                                                                          
Mining 0.199*** 0.148***
(0.052) (0.051)
Manufacturing 0.061*** 0.018
(0.019) (0.018)
Utilities 0.215*** 0.161***
(0.032) (0.031)
Construction 0.097*** 0.114***
(0.020) (0.019)
Services 0.050*** 0.022
(0.019) (0.018)
Public administration 0.079*** 0.032*
(0.019) (0.019)
Region A: Algarve 0.005 -0.010
(0.013) (0.013)
Region B: Central -0.053*** -0.076***
(0.012) (0.012)
Region C: Lisbon 0.072*** 0.043***
(0.010) (0.010)
Region D: North -0.044*** -0.081***
(0.011) (0.010)
Log likelihood -34448.00 -29188.26 -28716.48
n 14895 14895 14895
___________________________________________________________________________
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.
The dependent variable is a categorical measure comprising 13 intervals - see text.
Source: Inquérito ao Emprego.Table 5: Earnings Determination Across Job-Finding Methods, Log-Normal Distribution, Selected Coefficient Estimates, 1997
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                         Job Finding Method                                                                                     
Direct Friends/ Advertisement Public employment Other Examinations Contacted by
approach relatives agency employer
Variable
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Vocational training 0.061*** 0.043*** 0.079* -0.039 0.090* -0.015 0.069
(0.022) (0.015) (0.045) (0.030) (0.049) (0.022) (0.047)
Schooling 0.057*** 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.042*** 0.083*** 0.075*** 0.084***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Tenure 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.028*** -0.006 0.012 0.029*** -0.007
(0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Experience 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.030*** 0.012*** 0.029***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Fixed-term contract -0.031** -0.012 -0.089** -0.109*** -0.052 -0.074*** -0.003
(0.014) (0.011) (0.036) (0.030) (0.046) (0.025) (0.037)
Public administration 0.099*** 0.112*** 0.124 -0.139* 0.395*** -1.236*** 0.114*
(0.036) (0.026) (0.313) (0.077) (0.101) (0.163) (0.063)
Log likelihood -5836.24 -14622.60 -1002.49 -801.11 -970.23 -4218.51 -776.16
n 3053 7435 517 444 508 2506 432
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.
Source: Inquérito ao Emprego.Table 6: Probability of Choosing a Job-Finding Method, Multinominal Logit Estimates, 1997
____________________________________________________________________________________________
                                                                                       Job Finding Method                                                       
Direct Friends/ Public employment Contacted by
approach relatives Advertisement agency Examinations employer
Variable (3059 events) (7455 events) (518 events) (444 events) (2528 events) (432 events)
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Intercept 3.369*** 4.193*** 2.375*** 2.713*** 1.714*** 2.183***
(0.412) (0.379) (1.116) (0.591) (0.643) (0.461)
Vocational training -0.944*** -0.782*** -0.579*** 0.206 -0.194 -0.499**
(0.169) (0.141) (0.201) (0.219) (0.167) (0.238)
Schooling -0.208*** -0.203*** -0.062*** -0.242*** 0.042*** -0.133***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.025) (0.014) (0.021)
Experience 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.047*** -0.0003 0.124*** 0.090***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.014) (0.019)
Experience squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004 0.003 -0.002***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Male -0.218* -0.343*** 0.205 -0.573*** -0.215* -0.276*
(0.114) (0.100) (0.143) (0.176) (0.111) (0.164)
Mining 1.519* 1.020 - - - 0.524
(0.843) (0.739) (1.463)
Manufacturing 2.576*** 1.903*** 3.960*** 2.456*** 1.925*** 1.108***
(0.289) (0.268) (1.040) (0.526) (0.573) (0.353)
Utilities 2.557*** 1.664*** 4.142*** 2.045 2.861*** 0.484
(0.570) (0.533) (1.187) (1.284) (0.777) (1.020)Table 6, continued                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Construction 2.455*** 2.285*** 3.994*** 1.566** 0.509 0.913**
(0.359) (0.340) (1.074) (0.652) (0.791) (0.449)
Services 1.535*** 1.718*** 4.264*** 1.704*** 2.628*** 0.291
(0.278) (0.256) (1.034) (0.517) (0.558) (0.344)
Public administration 0.871*** 0.652** 2.675** 2.121*** 3.92*** -0.452
(0.289) (0.262) (1.043) (0.518) (0.559) (0.380)
Region A:   Algarve -0.758** -0.885** -2.156*** -1.690*** 1.084*** -1.954***
(0.381) (0.366) (0.579) (0.408) (0.390) (0.462)
Region B:   Central -1.245*** -1.755*** -1.484*** -2.515*** -1.351*** -1.504***
(0.351) (0.336) (0.460) (0.393) (0.350) (0.409)
Region C:   Lisbon -1.665*** -1.351*** -0.965** -3.037*** -1.661*** -2.261***
(0.327) (0.311) (0.400) (0.349) (0.326) (0.374)
Region D:   North -2.031*** -1.354*** -0.958** -2.914*** -1.382*** -2.769***
(0.327) (0.312) (0.403) (0.346) (0.327) (0.378)
÷
2 719.82 631.79 189.90 421.69 556.30 329.79
n                                         3575                  7971                     1034                              960                           3044                    948                               
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.
Source: Inquérito ao Emprego.Table 7: Transitions from Employment into Unemployment 1994-97 by Job
Finding Method, Logit Estimates
___________________________________________________________________________
___
Variable Specification
___________________________________________________________________________
___
Intercept -2.478*** -3.650***
(0.219) (0.227)
Direct approach -0.020 0.131
(0.188) (0.190)
Friends/relatives 0.117 0.257
(0.183) (0.184)
Advertisement 0.489** 0.382*
(0.213) (0.215)
Public employment agency 1.497*** 0.858***
(0.207) (0.210)
Examinations -1.099*** -0.714***
(0.228) (0.230)
Contacted by employer 0.794*** 0.666***
(0.204) (0.206)
Schooling -0.082*** -0.075***
(0.009) (0.009)
Male -0.185*** -0.150***
(0.053) (0.055)
Age -0.041*** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.003)
Tenure - -0.008***
(0.001)
Fixed-term contract - 1.315***
(0.062)
Full-time employment - 0.229*
(0.118)
÷
2 785.36 1992.30
n 127663 127618
___________________________________________________________________________
___
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:    ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.
The number of transitions from employment into unemployment is 1445.
Source:  Inquérito ao Emprego.Appendix
Appendix  Table  1:Factors Influencing Search Intensity (Number of Search
Methods Used) 1992-96, Maximum Likelihood Estimates of
a Truncated Poisson Model
                                                                                                                                                        
Variable                                                                              Coefficient                    ____________
UI recipient 0.146***
(0.0l7)
Schooling 0.032***
(0.002)
Tenure -0.005***
(0.001)
Age 0.004***
(0.001)
Male 0.107***
(0.014)
Married -0.044**
(0.018)
Handicapped 0.036
(0.068)
White collar 0.128***
(0.020)
Number of jobs 0.002**
(0.0001)
First job -0.094***
(0.025)
Collective dismissal 0.061***
(0.022)
End fixed-term contract 0.044**
(0.018)
Unemployment rate 0.078***
(0.007)
Duration (months)
1     -0.539***
(0.061)
2 -0.364***
(0.062)
3 -0.354***
(0.063)
4 -0.338***
(0.064)
5 -0.336***
(0.066)
6 -0.031***(0.063)Table 1, continued                                                                                                                          
Variable                                                                              Coefficient                    ____________
7-9 -0.281***
(0.061)
10-12 -0.243***
(0.061)
13-18 0.157**
(0.061)
19-24 -0.200**
(0.063)
>24 -0.160***
(0.061)
Region A: Algarve 0.318***
(0.031)
Region B: Central 0.100***
(0.032)
Region C: Lisbon 0.020
(0.025)
Region D: North 0.138***
(0.025)
÷
2 6805.754
n 16279
___________________________________________________________________________
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.
The model is a truncated Poisson regression because zero search methods are not
observed.
Source: Inquérito ao Emprego.Table 2: The Probability of Being Employed Under a Fixed-Term Contract
(Versus Open-Ended Employment) by Job-Finding Method, Logit
Estimates, 1997
_______________________________________________________________
_
Variable                                                                              Coefficient                                            
Intercept 1.843***
(0.184)
Direct approach -0.376***
(0.118)
Friends/relatives -0.501***
(0.111)
Advertisement 0.163
(0.147)
Public employment agency 1.278***
(0.152)
Examinations -0.897***
(0.126)
Contacted by employer -0.335**
(0.166)
Vocational training -0.056
(0.082)
Schooling -0.037***
(0.007)
Experience -0.157***
(0.006)
Experienced squared 0.003***
(0.0001)
Male -0.084*
(0.047)
Mining -1.630***
(0.556)
Manufacturing 0.545***
(0.135)
Utilities -0.427
(0.265)
Construction -0.032
(0.131)
Services -0.423***
(0.131)
Public administration -0.267*
(0.139)Table 2, continued                                                                                                                         
Variable                                                                              Coefficient                                            
Region A: Algarve -0.504***
(0.096)
Region B: Central -1.234***
(0.096)
Region C: Lisbon -0.634***
(0.075)
Region D: North -1.187***
(0.076)
÷
2 2217.32
n 14952
___________________________________________________________________
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.
The number of fixed-term contracts is 3063.